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The accession of Poland into NATO in the spring of 
1999 raises the question of how western attempts to 
transfer democratic institutions to new democracies in 
central Europe operated in reality as concerns reform and 
reaction.  Among the obstacles to this process was a 
western ignorance about domestic social challenges and 
political conflicts.  These go hand in hand with the 
process of democratic transition and show themselves 
starkly in the case of Polish politics, society, and 
military institutions in the years before 1999. 
While transitioning to democracy, Poland experienced 
two types of threats: one from civilian politicians who 
tried to use the military to accomplish their political 
goals, and another from military officers with political 
ambitions.  After the collapse of communism in 1989, Polish 
military forces remained highly visible in domestic 
politics for almost a decade and the issue of civil-
military relations was at the center of government crises 
on three occasions.  
Democratic civilian control over the military, a 
requirement to join NATO, became one of the primary 
political goals of an overwhelming majority of Polish 
elites since society saw the membership as the best 
guarantee of national security and a peaceful future.  
Politicians and government officials who did not accept or 
understand this determination were eventually voted out, 
dismissed, or now exist on the fringes of political life. 
NATO’s plan for Poland to move toward full membership in 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the first free parliamentary elections and the 
collapse of communism in 1989, the Polish military forces 
remained highly visible in domestic politics for almost one 
decade.  The issue of civil-military relations was at the 
center of government crises on three occasions.  In 1992 
and 1994, the ministers of defense were dismissed because 
of controversy over civilian oversight and the military 
forces’ involvement in politics. In February 1995, the 
press reported that General Tadeusz Wilecki, the Chief of 
the General Staff, was to be appointed prime minister. 
These rumors undermined parliamentary support for the 
government of Waldemar Pawlak.  Ultimately, an argument 
over whether the Chief of the General Staff should be 
subordinated directly to the president or remain 
subordinated to the defense minister became a crucial point 
of President Lech Walesa’s struggle with the parliament in 
1995. 
The interim nature of post-communist Poland’s 
political institutions was the greatest obstacle to 
establishing democratic civilian control over the armed 
forces.  From 1989 to 1997, before a clear constitutional 
framework gave the basis for a new structure of civil-
military relations, the Polish defense establishment was 
torn between Western pressure for civilian control and a 
domestic struggle for leadership over the military. 
While transitioning to democracy, Poland experienced 
two types of threats: one from civilian politicians who 
tried to use the military to accomplish their political 
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goals, and another from military officers with political 
ambitions.  The military forces nonetheless remain the 
premier symbol of Polish national sovereignty and 
independence and the Poles rank the military among their 
most trusted institutions. 
While some problems still remain, today Polish 
officers are closer to the democratic professional ideal 
than ever before. At the same time as the majority of Poles 
insist on having an apolitical military, the officers share 
with the civilian population not only the acceptance of 
democracy as the system synonymous with national 
independence but also the understanding that in a 




Since the setbacks of the early 1990s, Poland has 
settled the political confrontations of democratic 
transition.  This success has been possible mainly because 
of Poland’s goal to reintegrate into Europe, to join with 
the democratic West, and to participate in its security 
arrangements.  Wide domestic public support on one hand, 
and NATO’s plan for Poland to move toward full membership 
in the alliance on the other, resulted in a peaceful 
democratic transition.  The relationship of Polish society 
to its military and the role the military played in Polish 
history on one hand, and experience of martial law and 
military rule during last decade of communism on the other, 
were the reasons why control over the military was often 
the center of political fights and public attention. 
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Democratic civilian control over the military, a 
requirement to join NATO, became one of the primary 
political goals of an overwhelming majority of Polish 
elites since society saw the membership as the best 
guarantee of national security and a peaceful future. 
Therefore, before the institutional framework of 
democracy was created, political parties were forced to 
address the concerns of the Polish people regarding NATO 
membership regardless of their differences and to embrace 
the standards for democracy outlined by NATO. Those who 
undervalued public opinion and the population’s eagerness 
for national security and a “return to the West” through 
NATO membership, or those who did not embrace democratic 
values quickly enough ended up on the margins of domestic 
politics or disappeared from the political scene 
altogether. 
Hence, the door opened by NATO for a “former enemy” 
played a key role in Poland’s peaceful transition to 
democracy.  If the alliance had not presented such an 
opportunity, the Polish transition to democracy might have 




The Polish case is useful in studying the conflict 
between historical experience and new democratic 
institutions in post-communist countries because of the 
role the military has played in Polish politics throughout 
its history. It brings into focus the general determinants 
of civil-military relations in post-communist states, such 
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as the historical legacy of communism, adopted legal and 
institutional reforms, and economic factors, as well as the 
role of precedents established during the initial phase of 
transition. 
Over the last decade, Western attempts to transfer 
democratic institutions to the new European democracies 
have not always proved successful.  Not enough attention 
was paid to social challenges and domestic political 
conflicts, which go hand-in-hand with the transition 
process and the impact of external factors on the character 
of the transition.1 
Finally, other European countries building democratic 
systems and hoping to join NATO or to participate in other 
European security organizations should consider the lessons 
learned from the Polish case.  Like any democratic 
transition, Poland’s case was not without difficulties and 
challenges.  However, it is an example of a successful and 
peaceful transition to democratic institutions and ideals, 
including civilian control over the military, and Poland 
found a way to guarantee its security by attaining 
membership in NATO.  
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The evolution of control over military forces in 
transition from post-communism to democracy is usually 
understood in relation to the structural transformation of 
the state. This research project will analyze the evolution 
                    
1 Forster, Anthony, Promoting Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons Learned and Future Research 
Agendas. (Rep. No. TCMR 1.8, ch.4-5). Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces, 14-17 November 2000, Available http://civil-
military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk 
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of control over military forces in the Polish transition to 
democracy in the context of domestic and international 
policy.  The Polish experience demonstrates the direct 
influence of political circumstances on the quality and the 
nature of democratic reforms. 
This thesis seeks to examine the implications of NATO 
opening towards enlargement and the possibility of joining 
NATO on Polish domestic politics.  My argument is that 
public opinion and its understanding of the role played by 
NATO within European security arrangements are essential 
for the process of democratization of the states in 
transition. 
Chapter II will outline Polish history prior to 1989. 
The primary focus will be on Polish military traditions, 
the role the military played in maintaining the national 
identity over last two centuries, the origins of Polish 
military ethos and the impact of communist rule on the 
Polish military. 
Chapter III will delineate the development of 
international politics after 1989 with a focus on NATO 
policy towards former adversaries and its initiatives which 
opened the door for Poland’s membership. 
Chapter IV will discuss the process of redefining 
Polish national security policy after the disbanding of the 
Warsaw Pact. Separate sections will also examine political 
and social circumstances which shaped the new Polish 
National Security Strategy, and systemic changes undertaken 
to establish the democratic framework of the state. 
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Chapter V will center on obstacles Poland met in the 
process of establishing democratic civilian control over 
the military, which led to political crisis and even 
threatened its peaceful transition to democracy. 
Chapter VI will conclude the thesis.  It is my intent 
to show that, not withstanding the role of political 
elites, Polish public opinion and society’s eagerness for 
national security was decisive for restraining internal 
political fights and, in consequence, the peaceful 
continuation of transition to democracy and NATO 
membership. 
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II.   THE POLISH MILITARY BEFORE 1989 
A. POLISH NATIONALISM AND MILITARY TRADITION 
The relationship of a society to its military reflects 
the country’s tradition, culture, and history.2  The army 
has historically held a special status in Polish politics.  
The survival of the Polish government and the continuity of 
the Polish state have been closely connected to the 
country’s military. 
At the same time, the values of society shape the 
esprit de corps of the armed forces in 
transitional polities, and, to a large extent, 
those values will determine the kind of 
professional military that will emerge from the 
transition period.3 
 The tradition of the Polish military goes back a 
millennium, but three key influences have shaped the Polish 
military ethos: the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth; the army of the Second Republic of 1918-1939 
and the trauma of World War II; and the Polish People’s 
Army prior to 1989.  It was formed by the struggle of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for regional supremacy 
against the Germans, the Swedes, and the Russians, as well 
as by the legacy of armed insurrections against foreign 
occupation.4 
One need only look at Polish national heroes to see 
the distinct military relationship to society.  The Polish 
                    
2 Joó, Rudolf. The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces. The Institute 
for Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 23, 
February 1996. p.21 
3 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.1 
4 Ibid. p.23 
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founding fathers include military men who made great 
sacrifices for Poland.  One military hero is Tadeusz 
Kosciuszko, an expert military engineer and leader of the 
failed 1794 uprising against Russia and Prussia.  In modern 
times, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski’s military vision for the 
restoration of Poland gave rise to the Second Republic in 
1918. 
Polish history places the soldier at the center of the 
Polish national independence movement.  When the Polish 
state no longer existed on European maps in the late 
eighteenth century, it was the military ethos that became 
the central point of Polish national aspirations.  After 
1918, that ethos was carried intact into the brief 
independence of the restored interwar Second Republic. 
Furthermore, the Polish military was directly involved in 
politics during the twenty years of the Second Republic, 
which was ultimately an extension of the country’s 
tradition of armed struggle for independence.  It was the 
soldier who played a vital role in restoring Polish 
statehood, and the soldier ultimately became Poland’s 
custodian and then its defender in World War II.5 
Between the two world wars, the Polish army protected 
Polish national identity, and ultimately guaranteed the 
political rise of ethnic Poles.  Poland was a multi-ethnic 
society, with ethnic Poles making up only 64% of the total 
population.  The remainder of the population consisted of 
polonized ethnic Jews, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and 
Ukrainians.  Therefore, the Polish military officer enjoyed 
                    
5 Ibid. p.24 
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a special place in the national identity of the majority of 
Poles. 
Jozef Pilsudski’s power between the two world wars 
owed much to the popular belief that, since not the 
government but the army had won the restoration of Polish 
statehood, only the army could guarantee the country’s 
continued sovereignty.  The brief Polish-Soviet war (1919 - 
1921), as a result of which Poland’s borders were extended 
eastward, made the military the custodian of Poland’s 
statehood. This translated into tremendous political 
influence for Pilsudski and the Polish Army. 
By the end of the Polish-Soviet war, the officer corps 
was at the center of Polish political life.  Poles believed 
their army was the savior of Western civilization from 
Bolshevism.  They believed it was not only the defender of 
Poland, but the army that “destroyed the victorious halo of 
Red Moscow, and dealt a mortal blow to the global 
revolutionary plans of the Third International.”6 
To be an officer in the army of the Second 
Republic meant to be one of the best and the 
brightest, dedicated to the country and to the 
commander (naczelnik).  The officer’s ultimate 
allegiance to the military leader and the nation, 
rather than to the government, was a legacy of 
pre-partition Poland that endured in the Second 
Republic and would continue through the forty-
five years of the communist era.  The Polish 
officer became the steward of his people.7 
                    
6 Sikorski Wladyslaw, Nad Wisla i Wkra: Studium polsko-rosyjskiej 
wojny 1920 roku. Lwow: Wydawnictwo Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich, 
1928. p.257 
7 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.26 
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Continuing through history, the Poles never gave up 
the idea of continued armed struggle.  In 1939, after the 
Germans, in cooperation with the Soviet forces, defeated 
the army of the Second Republic, the disintegration of the 
regular Polish forces was immediately followed by the rise 
of an underground resistance movement under the command of 
a Polish government in exile. The guerrilla movement in 
Poland would ultimately rank as one of the most powerful 
resistance movements in Europe during the Second World War, 
and the London-directed Home Army would eventually number 
close to 380,000 officers and men.8 
In addition to the guerrilla army at home, a Polish 
army organized in the West fought in the 1940 French 
campaign, in Norway, in the Champagne, and on the Maginot 
Line.  Polish pilots fought in the Battle of Britain, 
shooting down 186 German planes (roughly 12 percent of 
total German losses during the battle).  By the end of the 
war, Polish pilots had shot down close to 1,000 enemy 
planes.  Polish units subordinated to their London-based 
government fought in Africa and northern Europe, took part 
in the Arnhem airborne landing, and contributed to the 
liberation of Europe on the Western front.9 
 
B. POLISH MILITARY UNDER SOCIALIST RULE 
A third formative element of the Polish military ethos 
is the experience of the communist takeover, followed by 
four decades of communist control in the Polish People’s 
Republic. 
                    
8 Pelczynski, Tadeusz, Armia krajowa w dokumentach. London: Studium 
Polski Podziemnej, 1970-1990. vol.3 
9 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
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The Polish military ethos carried over even into the 
communist Polish People’s Army.10  The Polish People’s Army 
(LWP) absorbed a number of officers with Home Army 
experience, as well as some officers who were German 
prisoners of war, and officers from the Anders army who had 
decided to return to Poland, even though it was controlled 
by the Soviets. The force was dominated by officers from 
the Berling army, who set the tone for the early 
development of the Polish People’s Army. 
Starting as a small force, the Polish People’s Army, 
organized, armed and trained by the Soviets in World War 
II, grew into the second largest Warsaw Pact force by the 
1980s. By 1989 the Polish officers’ esprit de corps had 
evolved into a blended form of nationalism, drawing from 
early Polish insurrections and later communism.  The Polish 
People’s Army nationalism was a result of Polish culture 
and its history of insurrection against its oppressors.  
However, it was blended with a communist character, 
influenced by Soviet domination and control.11 
The communists attempted to fully integrate the Polish 
Army into the structure of state institutions subordinated 
to the Communist Party.  The communist party executed its 
supervision over state’s apparatus, including military 
through: 
· determining priorities for state’s institutions, 
therefore through influence on their planning 
                    
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. pp.28-29 
10 Joó, Rudolf. The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces. The Institute 
for Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 23, 
February 1996. p.26 
11 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.42 
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· selection of personnel for state and military 
positions (verification of candidates) 
· monitoring the state institutions’ activities 
through control over its own members designated 
to public positions.12 
Communist domination over the Polish Army is 
considered a catalyst for its withdrawal from political 
interference.   
(T)he legacy of communist domination over the 
Polish army is the history of the subjection of 
the institutional interests of the military to 
those of the communist party. While the 
communists tried to integrate fully the military 
into the structure of state institutions 
subordinated to the party, the military attempted 
to impose limits on the scope of that 
subordination.  In this perspective, the 
experience of the Polish officer corps before the 
post-1989 transition made it likely that the 
military would seek autonomy from political 
authority even after the domination of the 
communist party had ended.13 
Pre-martial law Poland withdrew from the homogeneous 
totalitarian model of the early Stalinist period and 
society had some limited opportunity to open up, but these 
changes did not apply to civil-military relations. 
Communist leadership considered the military together with 
the police, two typical power institutions, pillars of the 
regime and guardians of the system.14 
                    
12 Zebrowski, Andrzej, Kontrola cywilna nad Silami Zbrojnymi 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Warsaw, Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, 1998. p.43 
13 Michta. p. 45, Author refers to the argument made by Kolkowicz 
Roman, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1967. p.103 
14 Joó, Rudolf. The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces. The Institute 
for Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 23, 
February 1996. p.13 
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[T]he communist Party exercised neither 
democratic nor truly civilian control over the 
Army. It did not exercise democratic control, 
because the Communist Party’s institutions and 
mechanisms lacked the basic requirements of 
democratic control and accountability.15 
The issue of civilian control and oversight of the 
military was not a concern of politicians in communist 
Poland.  The minister of defense, who was also the highest-
ranking military officer, controlled the military forces.  
While in theory the defense minister was subordinated to 
the prime minister, in reality, both the civilian 
government and the military were fully built into a 
monolithic system, every element of which was subordinated 
to the communist party. The Polish communist party was 
directly represented in the armed forces trough its cells 
and institution of the Main Political Directorate and its 
commissar’s system of political officers.  Both, the party 
cells and political officers were present in every unit 
from top to bottom of military structure and they had 
decisive influence over the career paths of fellow 
officers. 16 Party membership and political “correctness” 
was a necessary requirement for promotion and often 
decisive, especially for officer’s career.17  
Another alien body controlling the military structure 
from top to bottom was the Counterintelligence Service 
which was subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
                    
15 Ibid. p.12 
16 Ibid. pp.12-14 
17 Babula, Julian. Wojsko Polskie 1945-89. Warsaw, Dom Wydawniczy 
Bellona, 1998. p.305 
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Its main tasks were to spy on military personnel to ensure 
political reliability and to combat the ‘internal enemy’.18 
Before 1989, the Polish military was represented, in 
all official historiography as well as in communist 
propaganda, as an ideological monolith, unconditionally 
faithful to the communist party, and ready to defend 
socialism at any cost. The military was considered to be a 
totally indoctrinated and reliable communist party 
supporter, and a pillar of the regime. 
However, documents de-classified after 1989, including 
files of the Polish Central Military Archives (Centralne 
Archiwum Wojskowe), demonstrate that the Polish military 
was never the ideological monolith alienated from Polish 
society as was thought, for many of them did not accept 
communist policy and some even openly defied orders.  In 
1956, when Polish troops were sent to ‘restore order’ in 
the city of Poznan, numerous acts of sabotage and mutiny 
took place in military units against the presence of Soviet 
troops on Polish territory, and Soviet control over the 
Polish military.  Soldiers demanded the removal of Red Army 
officers from the Polish military, the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Polish territory, and the return of the 
barracks, hospitals and logistic infrastructure that was 
under Soviet control to Polish society.  From reports to 
the Main Political Directorate exists documentation of 
troops refusing to fight and officers who declared their 
intention to commit suicide rather than shoot protesting 
workers.19 
                    
18 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.44 
19 Komorowski, Bronislaw, Wojsko nie bylo monolitem. Rzeczpospolita. 
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Those reports resulted in the Chief’s of General Staff 
directive issued on the 8th of October 1956, banning the use 
of Polish military units in any actions to ‘restore public 
order and security,’ pointing out that these types of 
duties were exclusively the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Militia.  Unfortunately, the tragic 
events following in December 1970 and later during martial-
law proved that military and party leaders had not learned 
those lessons well enough.20 
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, General Wojciech Jaruzelski 
became the defining figure of the Polish armed forces, and 
the man who shaped Polish civil-military relations.  He is 
considered one of the most influential military-leaders of 
Poland’s communist era, however, his political role was 
full of contradictions. When he announced imposition of 
martial law, on the 13th of December 1989, his simultaneous 
positions as the First Secretary of Polish communist 
party’s (PZPR) Central Committee, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Defense and the chairman of the newly 
established Military Council of National Salvation, gave 
him power as no politician before or later had held, but 
paradoxically his only political power was military.21  
Although he had suppressed the Solidarity movement in 1981, 
he peacefully transferred power to the opposition that had 
always stated that its goal was the end of communism in 
Poland, and even more interestingly, the punishment of 
himself, General Jaruzelski, and his associates. 
                    
No.150, 06.29.2001 
20 Ibid. 
21 Eisler, Jerzy, Zarys dziejow politycznych Polski 1944-1989. 
Warsaw, Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992. p.179 
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Jaruzelski’s martial law did not destroy 
Solidarity but rather ‘reduced’ it to a 
conspiracy at a time when an attempt to seize 
power by the union would have resulted in 
disaster. When Gorbachev and his perestroika made 
the transfer of power possible, Jaruzelski 
transferred power to Solidarity. 22 
After the imposition of martial law in 1981, 
Jaruzelski became the national political leader who 
presided over the final phase of the demise of communism in 
Poland and formed and shaped the Polish Army moving it into 
its post-communist transition. After 1989, Jaruzelski 
continued to command respect among Polish officers, who 
tended to see him as a tragic Polish patriot working from 
within to save the nation in the great romantic tradition 
of the nineteenth century.23 
 
 
                    
22 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.42 
23 Ibid. 
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III. NATO AND NEW PEACEFUL POLITICAL ORDER OF EUROPE 
A. AGENT OF CHANGE 
1989 was the starting point for fundamental changes 
in, not only the policy of NATO’s and Warsaw Pact’s member 
states, but in global politics.  They were symbolized not 
only by the fall of the Berlin Wall, but in addition, 
politically they were: the end of the Soviet Union, the 
Warsaw Pact, of a Europe divided into two enemy blocks, the 
unification of both German states, and finally resulted in 
the appearance of many independent states in central and 
southern Europe and in Asia. 
NATO played a crucial role in this process as a 
guarantor of security, freedom and independence for its 
members. It sustained the strategic balance of powers and 
supported the construction of European democratic 
institutions.  The alliance insured stability which was 
necessary to end the hostility between the two political 
blocs. Obviously, the end of the Cold War had great impact 
on NATO itself. 
Jeffrey Simon, in NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A 
Study in Civil-Military Relations, describes four distinct 
stages of political development for Europe and NATO in the 
1990s. 
The first geo-political strategic period following the 
end of the Cold War, according to Simon, occurred from 
1989-1990.24 This period was characterized by a “euphoria” 
                    
24 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement & Central Europe, A Study in 
Civil-Military Relations, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 
1996. p.7 
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emanating from the sudden creation or re-establishment of 
independent nation-states that promised new freedoms based 
on the principles of democracy.  In addition, their 
optimism was fueled by the possibility of becoming a part 
of Europe, including the hope of joining NATO and/or the 
European Community.  The first outstanding formal change of 
NATO was expressed by its July 1990 London Declaration.  
This declaration of a ‘transformed North Atlantic Alliance’ 
offered the ‘hand of friendship’ to the Soviet Union, to a 
few other states including Poland, and to the members of 
the still existing Warsaw Pact, to establish regular 
diplomatic contacts and mutual relations based on 
cooperation.25  These negotiations resulted in Germany’s 
reunification in October 1990 and the emergence of a new 
continental power.  In addition, NATO was enlarged to 
include the former German Democratic Republic in its 
security guarantee extending its membership to the Polish 
border.26 
The second period, beginning with the German 
reunification in 1990 and lasting through the end of 1991, 
was characterized by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, and the failed coup in the Soviet Union.27 
During 1991, several events occurred in Europe that 
indicated Europe’s willingness to engage the East.  In 
Copenhagen in June 1991, NATO commenced the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) ministerial meetings, which sanctioned 
                    
25 North Atlantic Council, London Declaration, par. 6-8 
26 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement & Central Europe, A Study in 
Civil-Military Relations, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 
1996. pp.7-8 
27 Ibid. p.8 
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developing military ties with the east.  The following 
November, in Rome, a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance 
was developed, which was designed to replace NATO’s long-
standing policy of Flexible Response.  The new concept 
declared a shift to a more politically active Alliance, 
defined roles for NATO’s military in peace and crisis, and 
became the cornerstone of NATO’s transformation as it set 
out the principles and considerations affecting the future 
role and the policy of the Alliance.28  One month later the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to 
strengthen the ties to Eastern states begun in July 1990 by 
the London initiatives for diplomatic relations. 
The third period, beginning in January 1992 and 
continuing through 1993 witnessed the disintegration of 
several states: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia.  In total, over twenty new states emerged 
in Europe.  In addition, Russia continued to withdraw its 
troops from Germany and Poland.29 
During this period, NATO was redefining its strategic 
role in the Pan-European organizations.  It was clear NATO 
needed a military mission to justify and adjust its 
military structure, forces and perhaps its very existence.  
The mission of NATO gravitated towards peacekeeping 
operations under the auspices of the Conference of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations.   
…At a June meeting in Oslo, the alliance decided 
to offer peacekeeping services to the Conference 
                    
28 NATO Handbook. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 
2001, p. 44 
29 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement & Central Europe, A Study in 
Civil-Military Relations, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 
1996. p.8  
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on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
including advice, support logistics, observers, 
forces and planning support or coordination.  
Secretary General Wörner personally pushed this 
idea very hard this year, and the alliance is 
confident of its capabilities…in this area…we 
have found that peacekeeping done by normal 
combat troops is very successful…NATO leaders 
like to say they strongly support the CSCE, and 
they were quick to portray NATO and CSCE (along 
with the European Community and the Western 
European Union) as “interlocking” not competitive 
institutions.30 
 
By September of 1992, the NAC agreed to make available 
alliance resources in support of UN, CSCE and EC 
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and monitoring heavy 
weapons.  In December of 1992, when the Defense Planning 
Committee expressed concern about risks to European 
security posed by regional conflicts, they recognized that 
NATO possessed a unique capability to contribute to 
peacekeeping operations in response to requests from the UN 
or CSCE, that support to these organizations should be 
included in NATO missions and that NATO would remain the 
essential forum for consultation among the allies.31  
Clearly, during this period, NATO sent a strong message 
that it was now in the peacekeeping business, and was 
willing to support operations throughout Europe. 
                    
30 David Shore, “NATO: Briefers babble, Bosnia burns”, The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, September 1992, Available 
http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1992/s92/s92.perspective.
html 
 31 SHAPE, The Evolution of NATO and Ace, available 
http://www.shape.nato.int/HISTORY/evolut92.htm 
  21 
Also, during this period, Boris Yeltsin signaled his 
support, and then change of mind about NATO’s enlargement 
into Central Europe.   
By the beginning of 1992, Alexander Rutskoi, the 
vice-president chosen personally by Yeltsin, and 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, the chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet, another former supporter of Yeltsin, had 
emerged as leaders of an opposition movement 
bitterly opposed to Gaidar's economic policies 
and Kozyrev's western-oriented foreign policy.  
By the end of 1992, the opposition groups were 
moving towards a power struggle against the 
Russian president which reached a climax in late 
September of 1993 when Rutskoi and Khasbulatov 
led the parliamentarians in an armed revolt that 
almost succeeded in overthrowing the government.  
The rebellion was quelled only after Yeltsin had 
ordered loyal military forces to storm the 
Russian parliament building.  Yeltsin's military 
action inflicted great damage on his political 
reputation as an authentic democratic leader and 
henceforth his policies moved closer to those 
hardline military leaders whose support he needed 
to maintain order and remain in power.32 
NATO and EU hesitancy toward enlarging into Central 
Europe, coupled with Russia’s pursuit of a “Near Abroad” 
policy, and another failed coup attempt in Russia in 1993 
increased Central European pessimism about Russia’s 
prospects for democratic political development, and 
national security east of NATO.  Skepticism about support 
from the West grew.33 
                    
 32 Alan F. Fogelquist, Ph.D. Russia, Bosnia and the Near Abroad. 
Paper Presented April 19, 1995 at the International Conference on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Organized by Bilkent University and the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey  Available 
http://eurasianews.com/bilklast.htm  
 33 Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement & Central Europe, A Study in 
Civil-Military Relations, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 
1996. pp.8-9 
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The fourth period, recognized by Simon, opened with 
NATO’s January 1994 Brussels Summit, which adopted the 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Partnership For Peace 
(PFP), and committed the Alliance to future enlargement.34  
 
B. POLICY TOWARDS FORMER ADVERSARIES 
1. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
The first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) on December 20, 1991 was the immediate and 
direct consequence of the North Atlantic Council’s 
Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (The Rome Declaration) 
and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, both issued a month 
earlier in Rome.35  The alliance invited the foreign 
ministries of all the former Warsaw Pact members to meet 
their NATO counterparts and to “develop a more 
institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation 
on political and security issues.”36 
In particular the Rome Declaration proposed the 
following activities:37 
· annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council 
at ministerial level; 
· periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council 
at Ambassadorial level;  
· additional meetings with the North Atlantic 
Council at ministerial or ambassadorial level as 
circumstances warrant;  
                    
34 Ibid. p.9 
35 Both available http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm  
36 North Atlantic Council, The Rome Declaration, Rome 1991. par. 11 
37 Ibid. 
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· regular meetings, at intervals mutually agreed, 
with:  
o NATO subordinate committees, including the 
Political and Economic Committees;  
o the Military Committee and under its 
direction other NATO Military Authorities.  
Under auspices of the NATO committees, the NACC states 
would hold meetings related to security issues such as 
defense planning, arms control, democratic concepts of 
civil-military relations, civil-military coordination of 
air traffic management, and the conversion of defense 
production to civilian purposes.38 
Initially, NACC was comprised of mainly European 
states and had a character of a European organization.  It 
was composed of the sixteen NATO members, six states of 
central Europe and three Baltic states.  After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, all the members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States were invited to join the organization 
soon after its first meeting, its change in character 
became apparent.  As a result, there were three distinct 
groups of NACC participants:39 
· The states that wanted to join NATO as soon as 
possible (e.g. central European states); 
· The states that advocated cooperation without 
declaring their intent to join the Alliance; 
                    
38 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed. The Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press,  1998. p.95 
39 Kupiecki, Robert. NATO u progu XXI wieku. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo 
ASKON, 2000. pp. 49-50 
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· The states without precise expectations towards 
cooperation or unable to utilize the offer (e.g. 
non-European former Soviet Union states). 
In addition, there was Russia which had interests 
opposite to its former central-European satellites, and 
Ukraine trying to gain its independent place in NATO 
policy.40  It soon became apparent that NACC was not able to 
take any action toward many issues raised at the meetings 
and the organization became “a gigantic talking shop.”41 
NACC was a token of NATO openness towards new forms 
and areas of cooperation in a dynamically developing 
international situation, but its capabilities were limited 
because of the diversity of its participants, and their 
different political goals and expectations.  In such 
circumstances, January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels 
launched the initiative of Partnership for Peace (PfP).  
This new initiative was to remain within the overall 
framework of the NACC, however, as “the experience, 
interests and capacities of NATO’s partners” varied 
extensively, “the pace and scope of cooperation under the 





                    
40 Ibid. p. 50 
41 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed. The Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press,  1998. pp.95-96 
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2. The Partnership for Peace 
At the January 1994 summit in Brussels, NATO invited 
all the states participating in NACC to join the 
Partnership for Peace initiative.  Other European countries 
wishing to join PfP were encouraged to do so upon 
individual agreement with the alliance.  This initiative 
was launched to bring the militaries of the CSCE area 
closer to NATO standards to enable future joint activities 
such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and search and 
rescue operations to be more successful and efficient.  
Since its inception, participation in PfP has given NATO’s 
partners a chance to prepare for membership if they were 
willing to take full advantage of the opportunities of 
participation in PfP,43 however, its founding documents do 
not offer any precise timetable or criteria to enable them 
to attain membership. 
The PfP Framework Document has given NATO’s partners 
the opportunity to demonstrate their intent and level of 
preparation for NATO membership, and the compatibility of 
their weaponry and military procedures.  In return, 
participants receive NATO’s “commitment to consult with any 
active participant if the partner perceives a direct threat 
to its territorial integrity, political independence, or 
security.”44 
The PfP moved the cooperation from general activities 
of NACC to individual programs of cooperation between NATO 
                    
43 Aspin, Les. New NATO, new Europe. NATO Review. No.1 February 1994. 
Available http://www.nato.int/docu/review/rev94-1.htm 
44 Moltke von, Gebhardt. Building a Partnership for Peace. NATO 
Review. No.3 June 1994. Available 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/rev94-3.htm 
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and each of its partners.  The scope of the PfP is 
expressed in its objectives:45 
a. Facilitation of transparency in national defense 
planning and budgeting processes; 
b. Ensuring democratic control of defense forces;  
c. Maintenance of the capability and readiness to 
contribute, subject to constitutional 
considerations, to operations under the authority 
of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; 
d. The development of cooperative military relations 
with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, 
training, and exercises in order to strengthen 
their ability to undertake missions in the fields 
of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian 
operations, and others as may subsequently be 
agreed; 
e. The development, over the longer term, of forces 
that are better able to operate with those of the 
members of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
Cooperation of NATO and any individual partner state 
within PfP initiative is based on Individual Partnership 
Program (IPP), which is jointly developed and accepted, and 
which contains the partner’s political aims in PfP, its 
assets to be made available for PfP purposes, the broad 
objectives of cooperation, and specific activities which 
are going to be implemented in each one of the cooperation 
                    
45 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document. Available 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt 
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areas.46  Therefore, despite initial skepticism among the 
Central and Eastern European countries about PfP, who 
perceived PfP as a mechanism to postpone their membership 
in NATO, this initiative turned out to be a flexible 
arrangement capable of accommodating multiple functions as 
diverse as the PfP partners’ reasons for participating.47 
PfP also appeared to be a very effective mechanism to 
bring the militaries of NATO’s partners to a basic level of 
interoperability with the Alliance, and it played the key 
role in supporting the transformation of the candidates’ 
militaries to the levels required for membership. 
[PfP] proved an extremely effective way gradually 
to build professional bonds, to harmonize 
standards and procedures, and to transform the 
technical and organizational incompatibilities 
into functioning systems.  Once the militaries of 
the three candidate countries recognized the 
Partnership for Peace as the practical road 
towards NATO membership, they became its 
unequivocal proponents.48 
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IV. MILITARY REFORM IN THE POLISH TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
Similarly, as in most of the new democracies of 
central and Eastern Europe, Polish strategic choices were 
shaped by six main factors:49 
· Threat perception especially in relation to 
former Soviet Union 
· Strong ‘anti-Yaltaism’ expressed in the desire to 
end what was seen as an artificial division in 
Europe, essentially its ‘ghettoisation’ in 
‘Eastern Europe’ 
· Defense choices were strongly influenced by the 
nature of domestic political and economic 
transition 
· Poland was keen to facilitate the eastward 
projection of western European stability  
· The country felt that it had a traditional 
historical and cultural affiliation with the 
‘West’, and was eager to ‘return to Europe’ 
· The developing geopolitical situation in Europe, 
particularly with regards to Russia, was an 
important driver influencing choice in this 
sphere. 
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Poland had to consider its role in post-Cold War 
Europe, and both the Solidarity and post-communist SLD/PSL 
(the Democratic Left Alliance/the Polish Peasants’ Party) 
governments supported integration into European security 
structures as a national security objective.  Despite 
political discord over defense relations and presidential 
and parliamentary authority, parties across the political 
spectrum agreed that NATO membership was in Poland’s 
interests. 
It is difficult to define the moment when the 
Polish road to NATO began. In a political sense, 
it is undoubtedly linked to transformation of the 
late 1980s – early 1990s. At the “round table”, 
proposals for Poland to leave the Warsaw Pact or 
even more, to join NATO – naturally – had not yet 
been formulated. Yet, the need to reorient our 
foreign policy seemed both possible and 
unavoidable even then, especially since the USSR, 
perestroika was advancing by leaps and bounds. 
The Brezhnev doctrine was challenged. We sensed 
our historic opportunity although we did not 
fully realize how far it could go and how fast it 
would be implemented. After all, we were the ones 
who paved the way for transformations.50 
The first formally binding document which turned 
Polish national security policy towards NATO was a document 
prepared by the National Defense Council titled “Security 
Policy and Defense Strategy of the Polish Republic.”51 
Signed by President Lech Walesa on November 2, 1992, this 
document recognized that revolutionary political changes in 
the Soviet Union and the countries of central and Eastern 
Europe between 1989 and 1992 were primary reasons for 
                    
50 Kwasniewski, Aleksander, Dom_wszystkich_Polska. Warsaw: 
Perspektywy Press, 2000. pp. 216-217 
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unavoidable changes to the security policy of the state.  
Since the signing of this document, Polish security policy 
has been based upon following principal premises: 52 
· Strengthening pro-European orientation through 
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic 
community structures 
· Pro-active participation in establishing a new 
European order based on comprehensive cooperation 
between states, foreign and international, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, 
especially UN and OSCE. 
· Development of good relationships with all 
countries, especially good-neighbor relations 
· Strengthening and advancing new regional ties, 
such as those between Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Slovakia, the Baltic states, etc 
· Enhancement of any activities aimed at 
stabilization and comprehensive development, 
especially economic stabilization 
· Development of bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
international cooperation, especially with 
western European states and the United States 
 
From Poland’s standpoint, NATO’s collective defense 
mission  was to assist Poland in dealing with any threat of 
aggression or coercion involving the former Soviet Union. 
Although Poland did not believe any immediate threat 
existed, it did believe that it could have been pulled 
                    
52 Kaczmarek, Julian, NATO-Europa-Polska 2000. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo 
Atla 2, 2000. p. 203-205 
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unwillingly into a war if a conflict in the former Soviet 
Union spilled over into the region. An unexpected, large 
influx of refugees, the disruption of supplies and 
resources, and infrastructure destruction were among the 
risks of paramount concern to Poles and Polish authorities. 
These types of concerns pushed Poland toward the collective 
defense umbrella of NATO.53 
 
B. ELECTORATE AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES 
Professor Leongin Pastusiak of the Gdansk University 
states that “support of Polish political elites for 
membership in NATO is deep, sound and based on more 
rational reasons.  Polish society is more emotional. It 
wants to be a part of united, cooperative and safe Europe, 
and that’s why Poland is the member of NATO.”54 
Although, the political, social and economical 
circumstances of early 90s did not support implementation 
of national defense policy drafted by Polish political 
elites.  As all new European democracies, Poland was 
suffering from deep economic crisis of transition to the 
market economy.  Also it was not free from some 
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nationalisms and minorities demanding their rights. Lack of 
strong political parties made political scene unstable.55 
In 1991, there were over 100 political parties on the 
Polish political scene, and in 1992 this number went beyond 
200.56 The bulk of them represented the former Solidarity 
movement.  Some parties represented post-communist 
political forces.  The process of formation of political 
parties, ideologically and structurally, was ongoing and 
far from consolidation.  Very often, they defined 
themselves as electoral coalitions rather than parties 
characteristic of the European political scene. The 
programs of many of those parties and organizations focused 
primarily on domestic politics: political, social, and 
economic problems of transition.57 
About 43 percent of the electorate turned out to vote 
on October 27, 1991 for the first totally free 
parliamentary elections in postwar Poland.  They elected 
the most diverse parliament in the country’s history: 
· The Democratic Union (UD), headed by former Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, received 62 seats 
(13.48%) in the Sejm (the upper house) and 21 of 
100 available in the Senat (the lower house). (See 
Figure 1.  and 2.) 
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· Just behind it was the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD), an alliance of post-communist parties and 
organizations, which obtained 60 seats (13.04%)in 
the Sejm and 4 in the Senat. 
· The Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) 
obtained 51 of seats (11.09%) in the Sejm and 4 in 
the Senat. 
· The Post-communists known as the Polish Peasants’ 
Party (PSL) won 50 seats (10.87%) in the Sejm and 
9 in the Senat. 
· The Catholic Action for Elections (WAK) received 
50 seats (10,87%) in the Sejm and 9 in the Senat. 
· The Centrum Alliance (PC) won 44 seats (9.56%) in 
the Sejm and 9 in the Senat. 
· The Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) obtained 37  
seats (8.04%)in The Sejm and 6 in the Senat. 
The next seventeen groups each managed to win less 
than 8 percent of the seats in the Sejm, including 
Solidarity which won 27 seats and the Polish Beer Lovers’ 
Party (PPPP) which won 16 seats.  Fourteen parties obtained 
less than 10 seats in the Sejm.58 
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Figure 2.   Senat Election Results October 27, 1991 
 
 
The diversity of the Sejm and political fights, 
especially between post-solidarity formations, were serious 
obstacles for the effectiveness of the higher house of the 
parliament in its constitutional missions, including 
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shaping national foreign policy.  Therefore, the Sejm’s 
role in establishing consensus beyond party lines for 
state’s foreign policy was almost impossible. 
Two categories of parliamentary groups were able to 
seek consensus.  The first included parties opened for 
integration with the ‘West’ and Polish participation in 
European security systems.  Those parties’ programs matched 
in many ways “Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the 
Polish Republic.”59  The second category, represented 
primarily by the Catholic Action for Elections, recognized 
consensus beyond party line as a political compromise, and 
its support for the state’s national security policy was 
limited by the fear that integration with the ‘West’ 
threatened national sovereignty and the ‘Christian-National 
identity’ of Poles. Most of its members were against 
ratification of the ‘Europe Agreement’ establishing an 
association between Poland and the European Communities, 
which was signed on December 16, 1991. 
The Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) was 
also against ratification of the Europe Agreement.  From 
the viewpoint of the party leaders, the treaty was a threat 
to polish sovereignty and national identity and 
ratification of this document would subordinate Poland to 
the European Communities’ laws and institutions.  KPN 
wished-for optional central and east-European integration, 
which would include the newly independent states between 
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the Baltic and Black Sea under the leadership of Poland and 
Ukraine.60 
The right-wing and center-right-wing political forces 
were much more concerned about the future of Polish 
national identity during integration process than about 
economic issues. Political forces of Christian-national 
orientation opposed the type of integration already taking 
place in Europe and they put forward, as an option, the 
idea of the ‘Community of Homelands’, which meant 
overcoming economic barriers without any loss to national 
sovereignty or independence.  They stated that integration 
already taking place was already limiting Polish 
sovereignty in many areas, especially in economic, 
political and legal realms. Therefore, these political 
forces demanded ratification of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
acceptance of the European Court’s of Human Rights 
competence with a clear and formal stipulation that 
international organizations would not interfere Polish 
law.61 
The desire for Polish membership in NATO has not 
always been evident or popular in Polish civil society.  In 
the middle of 1990, when a bi-polar world order still 
existed, the question of “What political development would 
be the best for Polish national security?” arose.  Sixty 
percent of Poles opted for simultaneously disbanding both 
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NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the development and 
participation in new, common security arrangements for all 
of Europe (whatever it would mean).  Only 5 percent of 
those polled opted for leaving the Warsaw Pact and joining 
NATO, 10 percent wanted to stay in the Warsaw Pact, and 8 
percent wanted Poland to become neutral.62 
Less than two years later, in March 1992, 77 percent 
of Poles polled thought the government should press for 
NATO membership; 30 percent of those strongly favored 
joining NATO and 47 percent were unsure but viewed Poland’s 
potential membership in NATO in a positive light.  Only one 
of every ten Poles was totally against integration into 
NATO. 
In October 1993, the proportion of the population 
strongly convinced of the necessity of NATO membership 
increased to 38 percent, but percentage of those positive 
but unconvinced slightly decreased to the level of 43 
percent.  The following two years did not bring any 
significant change in the tendency of slow but increasing 
public support for state’s policy toward NATO membership. 
However, in 1997, 90 percent of Poles were convinced of the 
necessity of NATO membership: 47 percent polled thought 
Poland should join NATO as soon as possible and 43 percent 
were positive about membership but they did not see any 
reason to expedite NATO membership. Only 3 percent of Poles 
were against NATO membership and 7 percent did not have any 
opinion about this matter.(see Table 1) 
                    
62 All the numbers are based on public polls by TNS OBOP Public 
Opinion Research Center. Partially available at 
http://www.obop.com.pl  















Table 1.   Public support for Polish membership in 
NATO 
 
In summary, between 1991-1992 Polish society radically 
changed its perception of NATO and eventually decided that 
the best guarantee for their national security would be 
obtained with NATO membership. Since then Poles’ 
relationship with NATO in comparison to other key political 
issues, like integration with Europe or domestic politics, 
has been extraordinary.  Even during the time of the 
deepest crises of public sentiment in 1992-1993 they did 
not lose their belief in the necessity to join this 
organization. 
In trying to understand the Poles’ relation to NATO, 
we have to keep in mind that for several decades before 
1989 this organization was a ‘black character’ of communist 
propaganda, and this image had, to some extent, influenced 
perception of Polish society. However, since NATO 
membership was defined as the political goal of the state 
in response to developing international situation of 1992, 
it was immediately accepted by majority of population, and 
  40 
eventually public support for this idea had been steadily 
growing. 
However, the most important observations from these 
statistics are:63 
· No internal politics, even the deepest economic, 
social or political crisis changed perceptibly 
public desire of national security and its intent 
to join NATO 
· The only case when the number of those who opted 
for staying outside of any international military 
organizations temporary increased took place when 
Russia strongly protested against NATO enlargement 
in the end of 1993.  Therefore, polls prove that 
the public opinion depended on international 
situation and was sensitive to international 
tensions. 
· The opinions about membership in NATO were 
changing only between its supporters and those who 
did not have strong opinion.  The number of those 
against the membership was almost constant and 
never beyond 10 percent. 
The last observation makes also apparent that since 
the chances for Polish membership became realistic there 
was no significant electorate for any political party, 




                    
63 Confirmed also by polls made by CBOS Public Opinion Research 
Center. Nowa rzeczywistosc. Oceny i opinie 1989-1999. Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, 2000. p. 205 
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
Civil-military relations mirror the society and the 
political system in which they are built.  The political 
system of a state in its transition to democracy consists 
of elements of both the old and new systems.  Old and new 
laws and political institutions, each designed to serve a 
very different power structure exist side-by-side.64  
Between 1989 and 1992 Poland went through the greatest 
systemic changes of the democratic transition period. 
Authoritarian or “real socialism” was replaced step-by-step 
by a framework of parliamentary democracy. This change was 
not just a single revolutionary act but a result of complex 
evolution.  Constitutional changes were essential for this 
evolution of the political system.  On one hand, amendments 
to the constitution were the result of ongoing social and 
political changes, on the other they were a catalyst for 
upcoming events. 
Between 1989 and 1992, the Polish constitution was 
amended seven times. The nature, range, and importance of 
these amendments differed. Some of them effected very 
narrow but substantial area like the presidential election 
procedures or the length of parliamentary tenure. The first 
three changes were directly related to the political system 
of the state. The most sizable constitutional reform was 
made on the December 29, 1989. The constitution in force at 
the end of 1992 was dated the 22nd of July 1952, however, 
                    
64 Joó, Rudolf. The Democratic Control Of Armed Forces. The Institute 
for Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 23, 
February 1996. p.20 
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its content was substantially different than its original 
version of forty years prior.65 
The starting point for subsequent systemic evolution 
was amendment to constitution made on April 7, 1989.  This 
amendment rearranged the state’s primary institutions.  It 
reestablished state’s bodies which had not existed for 
several decades: the lower house of the Parliament – the 
Senat, and the office of the president. The interrelations 
between state’s institutions were also significantly 
changed.  The Sejm became the higher house of the 
Parliament and maintained its position as the highest 
legislative body, but it shared its power with the lower 
house, and first of all with the president who was also 
given relatively large powers. 
The amendment of April 1989 was the result of the 
Round Table agreement. To understand its significance we 
have to consider it with other political factors which were 
associated with the amendment such as the new electoral 
laws of both houses of the Parliament and the Law of 
Associations (Prawo o Stowarzyszeniach) which broke 
communist party control over any social movements and made 
possible activity of the free labor unions and independent 
political parties. All those factors together manifested 
the change from “real socialism”, especially the communist 
party monopoly in the government where the communists were 
guaranteed by law to maintain a parliamentary majority. In 
                    
65 University of Warsaw Institute of Political Sciences. 
Przeobrazenia ustrojowe w Polsce. Warsaw, Dom Wydawniczy i Handlowy 
Elipsa, 1993. p.67 
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effect, these constitutional changes meant the turn towards 
political pluralism and parliamentary democracy.66 
Not only did the successive changes in the old 
constitution not keep pace with social and political 
changes in the state but also, to some extent, they made 
the constitution unclear and even contradictory.  
Therefore, on October 17, 1992 it was replaced by an 
interim constitutional act – the “Little Constitution”. Its 
objective was to eliminate existing ambiguities and 
contradictions of existing constitutional law and to 
establish a legal basis for more effective governance.67 
The "Little Constitution" was a transitional document.  
Its intent was to bring together the competing political 
forces of Poland’s early post-communist transition.  The 
competing political forces were the “contract parliament” 
(guaranteeing control of Sejm to the communists) and the 
first democratically elected president who possessed a 
popular mandate for systemic change, and the moral 
authority of past anticommunist dissent.  Therefore, 
interrelations between state’s institutions were changed 
once again; the Sejm lost its legislative supremacy and the 
role of the Senat, the president and the government were 
elevated.68 
Before the new constitution of 1997 superceded the 
1992 “Little Constitution,” presidential and government 
executive authority disputes rendered the oversight 
authority of the parliament over military relatively weak. 
                    
66 Ibid. p. 68 
67 Ibid. p. 88 
68 Ibid. pp.88-89 
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Forged as a compromise reflecting the power struggle 
between President Lech Walesa and the parliament, the 1992 
Constitution gave the president a decisive voice on matters 
of national security.69 
The president, as the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, was instrumental in selecting the Minister of 
Defense as well as the Chief of the General Staff, the 
chiefs of the military services, the commanders of the 
military districts, and the commander of the overall armed 
forces.  The 1992 Constitution in effect made the military 
a player in Polish domestic politics.  Between 1992 and 
1995, these constitutional prerogatives became a powerful 
incentive for President Walesa and senior military officers 
to bypass the institutions of the Ministry of Defense and 
to ignore the Defense Minister altogether.  Another 
contributing factor indirectly tied to the constitutional 
question was the relative weakness of the Polish 
parliament, especially the lack of qualified staff to 
oversee military affairs.70 
 
 
                    
69 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.79 
70 Ibid. pp.79-80 
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V. CIVIL-MILITARY CONFLICTS, 1992-1997 
A. EXECUTIVE STRATEGIES TO ASSERT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER 
THE MILITARY 
It was the so-called Parys affair of 1992 and the 
Drawsko affair of 1994 that set the pattern for civil-
military relations in Poland.  Prior to becoming defense 
minister in the center-right Jan Olszewski government, Jan 
Parys had minimal to no exposure to the military. He was a 
staunch nationalist.  He believed that all members of the 
Polish military were untrustworthy and that he was working 
with an institution loaded with Moscow spies.  This 
constituted a hostile environment for civil-military 
relations.  Parys became the focal point for the power 
struggle between the President and the Prime Minister when 
he forced the retirement of Adm. Piotr Kolodziejczyk, whom 
Walesa reportedly intended to be his choice for the planned 
position of general inspector of the armed forces.  
Understandably, senior Polish military officers had the 
perception that civilian control meant politicization, with 
the realization of the duality of political power. 
After Kolodziejczyk’s forced retirement, civil-
military relations in Poland deteriorated rapidly.  On 
January 29, 1992 shortly after taking office, Parys made 
several diplomatic mistakes that contributed to undermining 
civil-military relations.  First, he announced in a speech 
to the top officials of the Defense Ministry Military 
Council that he was going to purge the military of all 
‘Russian agents’.  He forced the retirement of all senior 
officers, who were members of General Jaruzelski’s military 
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inner circle.  He spoke of “traitors and death sentences” 
when referring to what he believed were military enemies, 
and he continuously insulted military personnel when he 
visited military units.71  He would arrive with such a large 
security contingent that it was as if he was making a 
public statement that the Polish military was the “enemy," 
thereby gravely insulting the historical honor and 
privileged status of the Polish military. 
The crisis became extremely acute when Defense 
Minister Parys during a meeting with the General Staff’s 
officers on April 6, 1992 stated without mentioning any 
names, that “some officers are invited for meetings that 
the minister and the Chief of the General Staff have no 
knowledge of and are offered promotions in exchange for the 
support of the military in some kind of political game.”72  
He was possibly referring to the meeting between Jerzy 
Milewski, a civilian closely associated with President Lech 
Walesa, and Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki.  During the meeting, 
Milewski reportedly told Gen. Wilecki that he was the 
president’s choice as the new chief of the General Staff.  
In the aftermath, the Prime Minister Jan Olszewski 
dismissed Parys, and President Walesa indeed promoted Gen. 
Tadeusz Wilecki to three-star rank and appointed him as the 
new chief of the General Staff.73 
The crisis was part of a larger power struggle between 
Walesa and the Olszewski government over the actual scope 
of presidential authority on security and defense matters 
                    
71 Kurski Jacek and Semka Piotr, Lewy czerwcowy. pp. 64, Warsaw: 
Editions Spotkania, 1993. 
72 Groblewski, Kazimierz. Wszystko juz bylo. Rzeczpospolita. 
10.12.1994. Available http://www.rp.pl/archiwum 
73 Ibid. 
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outlined in the 1992 Constitution.  As the confrontation 
between the president and the minister of defense 
intensified, Parys defined his ministerial mission as a 
“struggle over the future of the political system in 
Poland: whether the system will be democratic or whether 
dictatorship will prevail.”74 
The Sejm’s condemnation of Parys for triggering the 
1992 confrontation allowed Wilecki to consolidate his 
position in relation to the civilian structures of the 
Ministry of Defense.  As the “president’s man,” Wilecki and 
the military both became important factors in Polish 
domestic politics.  Competition erupted between the 
president and the parliament for the allegiance of the 
General Staff.  In effect, it became a prize.  More 
importantly, the affair strengthened the perception among 
General Staff officers that the army faced a concerted 
onslaught from the civilians.  As Wilecki observed later 
on, the army had the “right to defend itself.”  Most 
significantly, the Parys affair made it clear that the 
struggle for control over the armed forces and the 
allegiance of the military was an important and ongoing 
part of the Polish domestic political scene.75 
 
B. PRESIDENTIAL OPTION - MILITARY STRATEGIES TO RESIST 
DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY 
The second crisis, referred to as “the Drawsko affair 
of 1994,” revealed a pattern of civil-military relations 
set forth by the previous scandal.  Between 1992 and 1994, 
                    
74 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. p.83 
75 Ibid. pp. 84-85 
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the General Staff became even more independent from the 
Ministry of Defense.  The September 1993 parliamentary 
elections accelerated the process because a new defense 
minister was appointed. The newly appointed defense 
minister, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, suspended the 1993 
regulations that restructured the Ministry of Defense and 
the General Staff because of alleged “inexactness of the 
legal terminology of the draft.”76  This decision preserved 
the arrangement favoring the General Staff over the 
civilian side of the Defense Ministry.77 
At a September 1994 dinner at the Army’s training site 
in Drawsko, a vote among the attending officers was 
initiated. President Walesa, Defense Minister 
Kolodziejczyk, Chief of the General Staff Wilecki, and a 
number of generals were present.  Though never proven, it 
is rumored that President Walesa initiated the vote.  The 
officers allegedly approved a vote of no confidence against 
Kolodziejczyk’s continued leadership of the Defense 
Ministry.  The minister of defense was taken completely by 
surprise.78 It appeared that the whole event had been 
planned prior to the dinner. Immediately, the parliament 
investigated the matter. 
Unlike the previous situation, the Parys case, the 
parliament sided with the defense minister against the 
generals.  The parliament demanded the disciplining of the 
officers involved in the incident, reestablishing the 
                    
76 Quoted in Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of 
the Polish Army After Communism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
p.91 
77 Ibid. 
78 Lentowicz, Zbigniew and Kazimierz Groblewski. Dzielenie skory na 
admirale. Rzeczpospolita. 10.06.1994 Available 
http://www.rp.pl/archiwum 
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ministry’s direct control over the intelligence and 
counterintelligence services, and reasserting civilian 
control over military structures.  However, the president 
fired Kolodziejczyk and reportedly granted monetary awards 
to some of the generals present at Drawsko.  Soon after, 
the president rejected a list of officers submitted by 
Kolodziejczyk for promotion to general officer ranks.79 
Keep in mind that the political neutrality of the 
military was one of Solidarity’s most important postulates 
of the Round table agreements, but in spite of numerous 
promises and assertions made by President Walesa and the 
succeeding ministries’ of defense that the military would 
maintain its neutrality, these promises appeared to be 
empty.  Military officers also declared that the military 
would resist any involvement in politics, but their actions 
belied their words.  At the Army’s training site in Drawsko 
“political field exercises” were held and the generals 
enthusiastically participated.80  
At a press conference immediately following the 
Drawsko affair, Prime Minister Pawlak expressed surprise 
that not only were the generals not punished but that 
President Walesa had given monetary awards to three of 
them. The prime minister also insisted that he did not know 
the three officers names because the president’s 
chancellery had failed to provide that information to his 
office.81 
                    
79 Lentowicz Zbigniew, Walesa i generalowie. Rzeczpospolita, 
10.22.1994, 11.08.1994. Available http://www.rp.pl/archiwum 
80 Groblewski, Kazimierz. Niebezpieczny poligon. Rzeczpospolita. 
10.12.1994. Available http://www.rp.pl/archiwum 
81 Michta, Andrew A., The Soldier-Citizen. The Politics of the Polish 
Army After Communism. p. 95, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
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The next rift occurred between Jerzy Milewski, 
Walesa’s former head of the National Security Bureau, and 
General Wilecki over the direction of institutional reform.  
This rift turned out to be a significant consequence of the 
Drawsko affair and of the progressive separation between 
the two elements of the Polish national defense 
establishment.  A tug-of-war occurred, lasting several 
months.  Finally, Milewski, frustrated with his one-time 
confidant Walesa, resigned his office as deputy defense 
minister.  He gave interviews to the press accusing the 
General Staff of subverting Polish chances for NATO 
membership and then became campaign advisor for the post-
communists’ (SLD) presidential candidate Aleksander 
Kwasniewski.82 
In January 1995, during the parliamentary debate over 
two competing programs of military control and 
subordination, the issue of who should control the Polish 
army came to a head.  On January 19, 1995, President Walesa 
delivered a passionate speech to the Sejm (the lower house 
of parliament), arguing that the “army ought to be led by 
the military men, who know the problems and are experts on 
the subject,” and asking for the adoption of his draft 
legislation.  This legislation would have made the Polish 
General Staff directly subordinate to the president, 
thereby bypassing the Ministry of Defense and the 
parliament altogether.  The Sejm Commission on National 
Defense submitted an alternative proposal that was 
supported by the ruling SLD/PSL post-communist coalition.  
The Sejm Commission’s proposal advocated retaining and 
                    
82 Zdort D. Marcin, Rodzynki na wage zlota. Rzeczpospolita, 
11.07.1995. Available http://www.rp.pl/archiwum 
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strengthening the existing structure of ministerial control 
over the General Staff and - reaffirmed the subordination 
of the chief of the General Staff to the defense minister.83  
The Sejm commission’s draft was reminiscent of one dating 
back to the ideas of Jerzy Milewski, former chief of the 
National Security Bureau. 
Walesa’s proposal was quite the opposite.  Walesa’s 
proposal received limited support in the parliament but 
only from the pro-Walesa Non-Party Block in Support of 
Reforms (BBWR) and the nationalist Confederation for 
Independent Poland (KPN). Walesa’s proposal was opposed not 
only by the PSL and SLD but also by the Union of Labor (UP) 
and the centrist Union of Freedom (UW).84 
On June 29, 1995, the Sejm adopted new legislation 
regulating the Office of the Minister of National Defense.  
This new legislation subordinated the Chief of the General 
Staff and the military intelligence and counterintelligence 
services to the defense minister.  Under the new law, the 
General Staff became an integral part of the Defense 
Ministry structure.  On August 11, 1995, President Walesa 
vetoed the bill.  He claimed that it would excessively 
reduce “the powers of the President on matters of national 
defense.”  The new law eventually did go into effect in 
1996 after the election of the SLD’s Aleksander Kwasniewski 
as Poland’s president.  This new law marked a turning point 
in Polish civil-military relations.85 
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C. PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DOMESTIC POLITICS 
The change in political systems, the first non-
communist government and the first free elections in 
Poland’s postwar history obviously resulted in positive 
public perception of domestic politics.  However, public 
sentiment began to change very soon.  Since 1992, negative 
opinions started to dominate.  The next few years were 
notable because of the constant splitting of political 
forces, and the fights among post-Solidarity factions and 
against post-communist parties.  Frequently changing 
governments, and presidential and parliamentary elections 
made public polls more positive only for a short time.  
Therefore, opinions regarding the political scene shortly 
became more a mirror reflecting current politics rather 
than a gage of the political problems of transition in 
general.86 Political scandals coupled with struggles for 
control over the military jeopardized the fragile state of 
democracy and were immediately reflected by public opinion. 
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Table 3.   Public opinion about policy of the 
president.88 
                    
88 Ibid.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the early 1990s, Poland has laid to rest the 
question marks that loomed over its transition to democracy 
especially as such doubts pertained to the soldier in the 
state.  In this connection, the role of the military strong 
man in the past gave cause for anxiety that went beyond 
Poland’s experience in the Warsaw Pact from 1955 until 
1991. Such success at stabilizing the democratic form of 
the state and the soldierly profession, however, has been 
possible because of the Polish collective determination to 
re-integrate into Europe, to share Europe’s security 
institutions that assure peace and freedom, and to build 
democratic institutions and secure freedoms. Politicians 
and government officials who resisted these efforts or who 
misunderstood this popular will found themselves tossed 
from office or simply remain on the fringes of political 
life. 
In this vein, this thesis has examined the character 
of the Polish military before and after 1989. Furthermore, 
this study has reflected on the character of NATO and 
especially its role in the transformation of Europe and 
beyond since the end of the Soviet era. Joined with this 
inquiry has been an analysis of the role of military reform 
in the transition to democracy in general. Finally, this 
study has devoted considerable attention to the civil-
military conflicts of the era 1992-1997 that, at the time, 
seemed as if they would preclude Poland’s effort to join 
the Alliance.  The last chapter contained an analysis of 
checkered efforts by Polish civilian figures to assert 
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their control over the military given the legacy of the 
Polish past before 1939 and after 1945. Particular emphasis 
fell upon the ups and downs of President Walesa, the Chief 
of Staff Wilecki, and those civilian ministers of defense 
caught in between during these important years. 
During the presidential election in November 1995, the 
voters turned on Walesa and chose the post-communist 
candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski over the heroic symbol of 
anti-communist resistance and victory in 1989. The victory 
of Kwasniewski again in the 2000 elections suggest that the 
Polish society clearly recognized the role of NATO 
accession and the importance of true civilian control of 
the military in their efforts to build a “new Poland” ready 
to take its place in western Europe, despite the 1999 war 
and the lessening of military prestige within society at 
large. President Kwasniewski’s contribution to democratic 
civil-military relations, that is, the effect of 
democratic/ministerial normalcy and an absence of 
attention-grabbing headlines about confidential meetings of 
generals proved popular and additionally, the Polish 
accession to NATO signified an enormous symbolic victory. 
Kwasniewski won 53.9% of the vote and gained a second term.  
The figures associated with a kind of Pilsudski-like past 
of authoritarianism and the man-on-horseback in Polish 
statecraft, Walesa and Wilecki, gained 1.01% and 0.16% 
respectively.  Walesa as well as former prime ministers 
Olszewski and Pawlak are now among the least trusted 
politicians in Polish politics.  This state of affairs, no 
doubt, derives from their having played fast and loose with 
soldiers and politics. 
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Broad public support for NATO on one hand, and the 
role of NATO’s PfP, PARP, etc. on the other, exerted a kind 
of push-pull on the process of democratic transition that 
cannot be ignored.  That is, the imperative of democratic 
civilian control of the military arose from domestic and 
international sources in a reciprocal relationship.  Polish 
elites championed the cause, which spread to Polish society 
as a whole.  To be sure, Poland played a key role in the 
Enlargement of NATO and, in the process, forged bonds of 
exchange with the organization and key allies that had a 
beneficial effect when things threatened to unravel in the 
first half of the 1990s in Polish politics.  In this 
connection of domestic politics, before the institutional 
framework and the transition to power of ministerial 
positions could consolidate in the first half of the ‘90s, 
public opinion drove the parties and leading figures in 
government and outside to address popular will for normalcy 
and the achievement of what came to be called NATO 
standards.  In fact, the Polish experience of having first 
demanded an opening of the alliance when no will in this 
direction was present, and then the ups-and-downs of 
praetorianism might be said to have helped to establish 
what, by the lights of 2002 (NCCC, four core PfP areas, 
EAPC, rise of the MAP after 1999, PARP, etc.) can now be 
called the “NATO Standard.”  In the years from 1979 until 
1989, in which the Polish people showed an extraordinary 
will to end the cold war and secure for themselves freedom, 
they did not shirk the additional burdens that arose before 
them in the first half of the 1990s concerning the effort 
to consolidate such gains once they seemed threatened by 
populism and militarism. 
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The case examined here adds an important example to 
the theory and practice of democratic civil-military 
relations in continental Europe and beyond.  Other scholars 
will have more to say about the nexus of domestic political 
forces and multi-national organizations in this particular 
form of transition to democracy and the reform of the 
security sector.  To be sure, Poland represents a excellent 
example.  Little of the past necessarily augured for 
success in the ‘90s.  Pilsudski’s authoritarian regime 
after 1926, the militarized fascism of the late ‘30s, and 
the role of the army in communist domestic politics in 1970 
and 1981 all suggested that the forces of evil might yet 
win out.  Had populism, praetorianism and militarism 
carried the day in the middle of the 1990s, the outcome of 
Polish accession might have been radically different and 
thus harmed the general Enlargement of NATO in the spring 
of 1999 at a time of high crisis over the ex-Yugoslavia.  
Thus, the wide recognition of the full weight imposed by 
events from 1979 and from 1989 on the Polish electorate led 
them to embrace democratic statecraft and to shoulder the 
burdens of a peaceful Europe that emerged in the 1990s.  
The result has been a stronger and more peaceful west, 
whose borders now extend beyond the Oder/Neisse to the 
plains of eastern Europe and act as sign of hope to others 
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